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Corporate Governance and Cash Policies of Multinational Corporations 
 
Abstract 
 
This study investigates cash policies of multinational corporations (MNCs) for a large sample of 
European MNCs and their subsidiaries in the period 1998-2004. The results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that cash holdings depend on a trade-off between the superior knowledge of the subsidiary 
over headquarters and the agency costs of discretionary behavior by the subsidiary’s management. We 
find that foreign subsidiaries hold more cash than domestic subsidiaries, although geographical 
distance from headquarters does not seem to matter. Horizontal subsidiaries hold more cash than 
vertical subsidiaries. Furthermore, we find that subsidiaries hold more cash if they are located in a 
country with better law enforcement and lower corruption. This result is consistent with the argument 
that better corporate governance in the subsidiary country reduces the risk of expropriation by the 
subsidiary management. Finally, the availability of external finance in the subsidiary country reduces 
the level of subsidiary cash holdings.  
 
Keywords: cash holdings, multinational corporations, parent-subsidiary relationship, shareholder 
protection, law enforcement, Europe 
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1. Introduction 
Why do firms hold cash? An extensive academic literature has focused on asymmetric 
information between firms and outside investors, and agency problems between shareholders 
and self-interested managers to explain cash holdings (e.g., Opler et al., 1999; Ozkan and 
Ozkan, 2004). Firms use cash to finance their activities and investments when asymmetric 
information and agency costs make it difficult to raise external financing. In manager 
controlled firms, self-interested managers prefer to hold large cash reserves in the firm. These 
reserves allow them to escape capital market discipline and give them the flexibility to pursue 
their personal interests at the expense of the shareholders (Jensen, 1986). In particular, 
managers will find it easier to use cash for their personal interests when the quality of 
corporate governance is poor. It has therefore been argued that better corporate governance  at 
the country level will make it easier for shareholders to control managers, and lead to lower 
cash holdings (Dittmar et al., 2003; Kalcheva and Lins, 2008). Furthermore, shareholders will 
value cash holdings higher if corporate governance is better, because better corporate 
governance reduces the risk that managers will use cash for their own interests (Pinkowitz et 
al., 2006; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Frésard and Salva, 2010). 
In the current study, we investigate cash holdings of multinational corporations 
(MNCs) and their subsidiaries, i.e. legally independent entities which are controlled by the 
MNC. Surprisingly, the existing literature pays little attention to cash policies in MNCs. A 
notable exception is Foley et al. (2007), who analyze the impact of repatriation taxes on US 
multinational cash holdings.1  MNC cash policies are particularly interesting to study for 
several reasons. First, existing studies of the impact of firm-level corporate governance on 
cash holdings typically focus on agency problems between management and shareholders of 
listed firms. However, the agency-relationship between MNC headquarters and subsidiaries is 
                                                 
1
 Other studies have focused on dividend policy (Desai et al., 2007) and debt policy (e.g., Desai et al., 2004b; 
Huizinga et al., 2008) within multinational firms, or on cash policy within business groups (Deloof, 2001). 
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fundamentally different from the shareholder-management relationship in listed firms. 
Subsidiaries are typically majority (or even fully) owned by the MNC, which should give 
headquarters the power to punish subsidiary managers if any misbehavior is found out. On the 
other hand, the superior knowledge of a subsidiary over headquarters (for example about local 
markets), and the geographical distance between headquarters and the subsidiary make it 
more difficult for headquarters to control the subsidiary. It can therefore be expected that the 
extent to which headquarters allows subsidiaries to hold cash depends on a trade-off between 
the superior knowledge of the subsidiary over headquarters and the agency costs of 
discretionary behavior by the subsidiary’s management. Second, MNCs operate across 
different countries with different corporate governance regimes, which will often deviate from 
corporate governance practices in the MNC home country. This raises the question how local 
corporate governance regimes affect the cash policy of subsidiaries. By investigating the 
impact of country-level corporate governance on cash holdings of foreign subsidiaries, this 
study provides a new perspective on the relationship between country-level corporate 
governance and firm cash holdings. Third, it is important to gain a better understanding of 
MNC financing policies, since in recent decades MNCs have become increasingly important 
in a globalizing world (e.g., UNCTAD 2005). 
Our results are based on a large sample of listed MNCs in ten European countries and 
their majority-owned subsidiaries in 16 European countries over the period 1998-2004. We 
find that foreign subsidiaries hold more cash than domestic subsidiaries. This is consistent 
with the argument that the informational advantage of the subsidiary over headquarters is 
greater for foreign subsidiaries because they operate in an environment that is different from 
the MNC home country. On the other hand, geographical distance from headquarters does not 
seem to affect the cash holdings of foreign subsidiaries. We also find that horizontal 
subsidiaries, which operate in the same industry as the parent, hold more cash than other 
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subsidiaries. This finding is consistent with the argument that horizontal subsidiaries operate 
more independently from headquarters than vertical subsidiaries, because of superior 
knowledge over and lower interdependence from headquarters (Alfaro and Charlton, 2009; 
Baliga and Jaeger, 1984). Further, we find some evidence that subsidiaries with minority 
shareholders hold more cash than fully owned subsidiaries; the latter being more likely to 
participate in an internal capital market of the MNC. Consistent with the argument that better 
corporate governance reduces the risk that the subsidiary management will expropriate cash 
from the controlling MNC, we find that MNC headquarters allows subsidiaries to hold more 
cash if they are located in a country with better law enforcement and lower corruption. 
Finally, we show that subsidiary cash holdings are negatively related to the availability of 
external financing in the subsidiary country, confirming the hypothesis that external financing 
reduces the need to hold cash. 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the effect of 
the headquarters-subsidiary relationship and country-level corporate governance on subsidiary 
cash holdings. Section 3 specifies the research design. Section 4 reports the empirical findings 
of this study and section 5 concludes. 
2. Determinants of subsidiary cash holdings  
2.1. The headquarters-subsidiary relationship 
 
The relationship between subsidiaries and headquarters in MNCs has a principal-agent 
structure. Since headquarters depend on the unique knowledge of its subsidiaries it has to 
delegate work and responsibilities to subsidiaries. However, self-interested subsidiary 
management may take decisions that are not congruent with those desired by headquarters 
(e.g., Nohria and Ghosal, 1994; O’Donnell, 2000; Roth and O’Donnell, 1996). This agency 
problem is potentially larger for foreign subsidiaries, because the absence of proximity can 
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make it especially difficult for headquarters to supervise the behavior of foreign subsidiary 
managers (e.g., Baliga and Jaeger, 1984; O’Donnell, 2000).  
According to Aghion and Tirole (1997), the key to delegating authority in a principal-
agent structure is asymmetric information. A principal will delegate authority to the agent if 
this agent is better informed and if her objectives do not deviate too much from those of the 
principal. However, when the interests of the principal and the agent are not perfectly aligned, 
the agent can use her informational advantage to make choices that are not in the best interest 
of the principal. As a result, the degree to which the principal delegates authority to the agent 
will be determined by the tradeoff between the agent’s superior knowledge and the agency 
costs of delegation to the agent (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2007). It can therefore be expected that 
within MNCs, the extent to which headquarters delegate authority to a subsidiary depends on 
the superior knowledge of the subsidiary over headquarters on the one hand, and the agency 
costs of discretionary behavior by the subsidiary’s management on the other hand. 
Subsidiaries operating more independently from headquarters are unlikely to be 
involved in an internal capital market of the MNC, since the benefits of shifting funds 
between business units via an internal capital market depend on the ability of headquarters to 
monitor and control these business units (Gertner et al., 1994; Stein, 1997). Independent 
subsidiaries are therefore likely to hold more cash for precautionary reasons and to minimize 
transaction costs. The precautionary motive for holding cash implies that a subsidiary can use 
cash to finance its activities and investments if other financial sources are not available or are 
excessively costly, while the transaction motive implies that holding cash saves transaction 
costs to raise money and avoids the need to liquidate assets in order to make payments (e.g., 
Opler et al., 1999). In our analysis we will consider four characteristics that reflect subsidiary 
independence based on the extent to which the subsidiary has superior knowledge over 
headquarters and the potential agency problems between headquarters and the subsidiary: (1) 
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foreign versus domestic subsidiaries, (2) fully owned versus partially owned subsidiaries, (3) 
horizontal versus vertical subsidiaries, and (4) geographical distance between headquarters 
and subsidiaries.  
First, we expect that foreign subsidiaries operate more independently from 
headquarters and hold more cash than domestic subsidiaries. As foreign subsidiaries operate 
in an environment that is different from the MNC home country, this is likely to result in 
greater superior knowledge of the subsidiary over headquarters compared to domestic 
subsidiaries. Hence, it can be expected that MNCs allow foreign subsidiaries to hold more 
cash.2  
Second, subsidiary cash holdings may be affected by the presence of minority 
shareholders in the subsidiary. The direction of this potential association, however, is a priori 
unclear. On the one hand, subsidiaries with minority shareholders may operate more 
independently from headquarters and hold more cash. The presence of minority shareholders 
makes it more difficult to tailor subsidiary activities to the needs of the MNC. Internal capital 
markets, internal product markets and tax-induced income shifting within the MNC create 
room for conflicts with the minority shareholders who have competing goals (e.g., Desai et 
al., 2004a). On the other hand, it could be argued that incomplete ownership of subsidiaries 
by the MNC decreases cash holdings because incomplete ownership impairs the ability of 
headquarters to monitor and control the management of the subsidiary. Partial ownership of 
foreign subsidiaries by local firms increases the risk that the subsidiary’s management will 
pursue related-party transactions that are not in the interest of the parent. A rigid policy to pay 
out cash may help to control subsidiary management by limiting its financial discretion. 
Consistent with this conjecture, Desai et al. (2007) find that foreign affiliates of US MNCs 
pay dividends on a more regular basis if they are not fully owned by the MNC. 
                                                 
2
 Another reason why foreign subsidiaries may hold more cash than domestic subsidiaries is that corporate 
income paid out as a dividend to the parent may be taxed both in the subsidiary country and the parent country 
(e.g., Huizinga et al. 2008). 
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Third, we consider whether the subsidiary operates in the same industry as the parent. 
Subsidiaries operating in the same industry as the parent are horizontal subsidiaries producing 
the same line of goods/services as the parent, while subsidiaries operating in an industry 
different from the MNC’s main industry are vertical subsidiaries (Alfaro and Charlton, 2009). 
Baliga and Jaeger (1984) argue that the extent of delegation provided to the subsidiary 
management will be determined by the role a subsidiary plays in the overall functioning of the 
MNC. The management of a subsidiary targeting a market which requires specific knowledge 
that headquarters do not have, will be accorded a higher level of delegation than the 
management of a subsidiary which is critical to the overall functioning of the MNC (e.g., a 
provider of key inputs). Moreover, the extent to which a subsidiary is allowed to operate 
independently will depend on the degree of interdependence between the subsidiary and 
headquarters. Horizontal subsidiaries are more likely to target local markets or market 
segments that require specific knowledge, while vertical subsidiaries tend to be important for 
the overall functioning of the MNC making the latter more strongly integrated with the 
parent’s activities. Hence, because horizontal subsidiaries generally operate more 
independently from headquarters than vertical subsidiaries, we expect horizontal subsidiaries 
to hold more cash than vertical subsidiaries. 
Fourth, cash holdings of foreign subsidiaries may be affected by geographical distance 
between headquarters and the subsidiary. Some recent studies have found that despite the 
abundance of alternative modern communication technologies, geographical distance still 
matters in finance (e.g., Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Malloy, 2005; Uysal et al., 2008). In 
MNCs, headquarters face higher costs of gathering information about the subsidiary’s 
activities if geographical distance is greater. The extent to which a subsidiary is integrated 
with the MNC and shares its overall strategy, goals and values will be based on the extent of 
face-to-face communication, informal interaction and travel of managers between 
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headquarters and the subsidiary (e.g., Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1988; Gupta and Govindarajan, 
1994, 2000). Geographical distance between headquarters and the subsidiary will make this 
kind of interaction more difficult or more costly (e.g., Carlin et al., 2007). Hence, subsidiaries 
at a larger distance from headquarters are likely to operate more independently, and can 
therefore be expected to hold more cash. Furthermore, since distance also makes it more 
difficult for headquarters to control the subsidiary, self-interested subsidiary managers may 
prefer to hold more cash because it gives them the flexibility to pursue their personal interests 
at the expense of shareholders (Jensen, 1986; Myers and Rajan, 1998; Pinkowitz et al., 2006).   
2.2. Country-level corporate governance 
Cash holdings of foreign subsidiaries are arguably affected by the quality of corporate 
governance in the subsidiary country. It can be expected that a better law enforcement and 
lower corruption in the subsidiary country have a positive effect on cash holdings of 
subsidiaries, since a better law enforcement and lower corruption reduce the agency costs 
associated with discretionary behavior by the subsidiary’s managers. Managers of foreign 
subsidiaries located in a country with a better law enforcement and lower corruption may be 
allowed to operate more independently from headquarters and hold more cash. This can be 
expected as there is a lower likelihood that they will “steal” this cash from the controlling 
MNC, and the odds are higher that the controlling MNC will get “stolen” cash back if 
contracts are well enforced and respected in the subsidiary country. Hence, this results in a 
predicted positive (negative) relation between law enforcement (corruption) in the 
subsidiary’s country and cash held by the subsidiary.  
However, there are two arguments against finding a positive relation between country-
level corporate governance and subsidiary cash holdings. The first argument is based on the 
idea that managers will find it easier to pursue their own interests when law enforcement is 
poor and corruption is high. As noted, large cash reserves allow self-interested managers to 
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avoid capital market discipline and to pursue their personal interests at the expense of the 
shareholders. Consistent with this prediction, Dittmar et al. (2003) find that firms hold much 
more cash if they are located in a country where shareholder rights are not well protected. The 
results of Kalchava and Lins (2007) suggest that cash holdings are positively related to the 
degree of managerial control, and that this relation is stronger when external country-level 
shareholder protection is weak.3  It is unlikely, however, that this argument against finding a 
positive association between country-level corporate governance and subsidiary cash holdings 
applies to majority controlled subsidiaries of MNCs. Since the MNC has majority control, it 
can punish subsidiary managers if misbehavior is found out. Furthermore, Harford et al. 
(2008) argue that large unused cash balances may be a too visible indicator of agency 
problems. Consistent with this conjecture, they find a positive relation between the quality of 
corporate governance and cash holdings of US firms. 
The second argument against finding a positive relation between country-level 
corporate governance and subsidiary cash holdings is based on the observation that capital 
markets are typically less developed in countries with poor investor protection (La Porta et al., 
1997). Corporate governance at the country level may therefore have an indirect effect on 
cash holdings via their impact on the development of capital markets. If the availability of 
external finance in the subsidiary country is limited, subsidiaries may respond by holding 
higher cash balances to finance their investments (e.g., Islam and Mozumdar, 2007). This 
implies a negative relation between the availability of external financing in the subsidiary 
country and the subsidiary’s cash holdings. When investigating the direct effect of country-
level corporate governance on firm cash holdings, it is therefore important to control for the 
indirect effect of country-level corporate governance via its impact on the availability of 
external financing (Dittmar et al., 2003; Lins and Kalcheva, 2007). 
                                                 
3
 Investors also value cash holdings higher if the quality of corporate governance is better because there is less 
risk that managers will use cash for their own interests (Pinkowitz et al., 2006; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; 
Frésard and Salva, 2010). 
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3. Research design 
3.1. Sample 
Data on subsidiaries and consolidated MNCs come from the June 2005 version of the 
Top 1,500,000 Amadeus database, supplied by Bureau van Dijk. This dataset provides 
comprehensive financial statement and ownership data for the 1.5 million largest (in terms of 
sales and total assets) public and private European companies and is compiled from several 
well-established national information collectors. We first consulted the Amadeus subsidiary 
ownership database to retrieve all listed, non-financial firms located in European countries 
with consolidated financial statements of which we can retrieve exact subsidiary ownership 
information on at least one subsidiary located within Europe: subsidiary identification code, 
subsidiary country of residence and exact ownership percentage held in the subsidiary.  From 
these MNCs, we retrieved all European subsidiaries in which the MNC had a direct equity 
stake of at least 50%; which have non-zero total assets; and for which all necessary 
information for the empirical analysis was available in the period 1998-2004. The final 
sample consists of 6,545 MNC-year observations for 1,271 unique MNCs and 13,321 
subsidiary-year observations for 3,607 unique subsidiaries relating to 16 European countries, 
with 8,321 subsidiary-year observations for 2,332 domestic subsidiaries and 5,000 subsidiary-
year observations for 1,275 foreign subsidiaries, all in the period 1998-2004. 
3.2. Country-level corporate governance 
We use three measures of country-level corporate governance. Rule of law is the 
country-level ‘rule of law’ score for each year developed by the World Bank (Kaufmann et al. 
2007).  This score measures for 212 countries and territories the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
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Control of corruption is the country-level ‘control of corruption’ score for each year 
developed by the World Bank, and measures the exercise of public power for private gain, 
including both petty and grand corruption and state capture. 4 Corruption Perception is the 
yearly Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of Transparency International 
(www.transparency.org). The CPI is an aggregate indicator that ranks countries in terms of 
the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. 
The index ranges between 0 and 10.  For all three measures, a higher score implies better 
corporate governance.   
As noted in section 2.2, investor protection may indirectly reduce the need for firms to 
hold cash because it increases the availability of external financing in a country. To capture 
indirect effects of corporate governance on cash holdings, we measure the availability of 
external financing in the country by private credit, which is domestic credit to the private 
sector as a % of GDP in each year (Dittmar et al., 2003; Kalcheva and Lins, 2007).  
*** Table 1 about here *** 
 Table 1 reports the 2004 values for country corporate governance characteristics, as 
well as the number of MNC observations and subsidiary observations for each country in the 
sample. In our sample, the best corporate governance scores are for the Scandinavian 
countries, Austria and Switzerland, and the worst scores are for Eastern European countries, 
Greece and Italy.  All countries in our sample have a rule of law and control of corruption 
score well above the worldwide average of zero, but the CPI-score of the Slovak Republic 
(4.0) is slightly below the 2004 worldwide average of 4.16.5  
3.3. Other variables 
                                                 
4
 Since rule of law and control of corruption scores are not available for 1999 and 2001, we used the score of the 
previous year for these years. 
5
 The worldwide maximum is 2.018 for rule of law, 2.456 for control of corruption and 9.7 for corruption 
perception, and the worldwide minimum is -2.312 for rule of law, -1.775 for control of corruption and 1.5 for 
corruption perception. 
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In line with existing literature on cash holdings (e.g., Opler et al., 1999), the dependent 
variable in all regressions is the natural log of cash and cash equivalents over net assets, 
which is calculated as total assets less cash and cash equivalents.  
 With respect to the relation between the MNC and its subsidiaries, we consider a 
domestic subsidiary dummy which is equal to one if the subsidiary is located in the same 
country as the parent and zero otherwise. Fully owned is a dummy equal to one if the 
subsidiary is fully owned by the parent and zero otherwise. Horizontal subsidiary is a dummy 
equal to one if the subsidiary has the same 2 digit NACE code as the parent, and zero 
otherwise (Alfaro and Charlton, 2009). For foreign subsidiaries, distance is the geographical 
distance between the capital cities of home country and subsidiary country (expressed in 
1,000 kilometers). 
 Cash holdings by subsidiaries may be affected by the corporate income tax system. 
EU countries apply the recommended OECD practice (OECD 1997) which allows for a 
bilateral country choice between source-based taxation and residence-based taxation. In a 
source-based system, firms pay taxes on foreign income abroad only, causing their foreign-
source income marginal tax rate being equal to the foreign tax rate. Foreign source income is 
exempted from taxes in the home country, and the MNC pays no additional tax in the home 
country. In a residence-based system, the home country taxes income generated abroad but 
provides tax credits for taxes already paid abroad. It may therefore be expected that foreign 
subsidiaries will on average hold less cash if a source-based system applies, because income 
paid by the subsidiary to the parent will be exempted from additional taxes in a source-based 
system. In a residence-based system by contrast, the parent company may still have to pay 
additional taxes on this income when repatriating these funds to the home country. In other 
words, in a residence-based system it may be preferable to leave excess cash in a foreign 
subsidiary instead of paying it out to the parent. We therefore include in our regressions a 
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control variable tax credit, which is a dummy equal to one if the home country grants credits 
for taxes paid in the subsidiary country (i.e. operates under a residence-based taxation 
system), and zero otherwise. If the tax credit system provides an impediment for the 
subsidiary to pay out cash to its parent, the tax credit should have a positive coefficient.  
 Further, it can be argued that the cash policy of individual subsidiaries will be 
influenced by the overall cash policy of the MNC. Subsidiaries are likely to hold more cash if 
the MNC to which they belong holds more cash. We therefore include the natural log of MNC 
consolidated cash scaled by MNC consolidated net assets as a determinant of subsidiary cash 
holdings. 
 Additionally, we consider subsidiary-specific controls that are commonly used in the 
literature on corporate cash holdings (e.g., Opler et al., 1999; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; 
D’Mello et al., 2008). The natural log of net assets measures firm size. If economies of scale 
exist for cash holdings, one would expect firm size to be negatively related to cash holdings. 
Our cash flow measure is EBITDA over net assets. Firms with a high cash flow can save more 
cash. Leverage is short- and long-term debt over net assets. According to the pecking order 
model, firms with a surplus of internal funds will accumulate cash and pay back debt, while 
firms with a deficit of internal funds will decrease cash holdings and raise debt. Net working 
capital, which is measured by inventories plus receivables minus payables over net assets, 
could be a substitute for cash holdings. Intangibility is intangible fixed assets over total fixed 
assets and measures the extent to which the firm has firm-specific assets, which cannot be 
easily converted into cash. Moreover, in case of financial distress they cannot be liquidated at 
their intrinsic value and therefore provide an incentive to hold more cash. Capital 
expenditures are calculated as the change in book value of fixed assets plus depreciation over 
net assets. A firm that invests more is likely to have fewer internal resources. All regressions 
reported in this paper also include year dummies and industry dummies at the one digit 
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NACE level. Our sample only includes non-financial MNCs. However, the main activity of a 
limited number of subsidiaries is financial intermediation (NACE 65 and 67). In the 
regressions for the subsidiaries, we therefore also include a financial subsidiary dummy that 
equals one if the subsidiary is in NACE industries 65 or 67. 
In the empirical analysis, we will not only consider the determinants of subsidiary 
cash holdings but also the determinants of MNC consolidated cash holdings to see whether 
these are in line with results from prior research. All determinants of consolidated cash 
holdings are defined in the same way as in the analysis of subsidiary cash holdings. 
Additionally we include the natural log of the number of countries worldwide in which the 
MNC has subsidiaries, as a measure of complexity and the extent of internationalization of the 
MNC. Since all the MNCs in our sample are listed, we also include the market-to-book ratio. 
Market-to-book is the market value over the book value of equity and measures the extent to 
which the firm has firm-specific assets, which cannot be easily converted into cash. It is often 
also used as proxy for investment opportunities. Firms with valuable investment 
opportunities, for which the cost of external financing is high, are likely to hold more cash 
since the cost of being short of funds is high (Myers, 1977).   
*** Table 2 about here *** 
Table 2 reports statistics for MNCs (6,545 observations), domestic subsidiaries (8,321 
observations) and foreign subsidiaries (5,000 observations). There is wide variation in cash 
holdings. The median MNC in our sample has consolidated cash holdings equal to 
approximately 6% of net assets (mean is 14%). The median domestic and foreign subsidiaries 
have cash equal to 3.4% and 4.2% of net assets (means are 17.1% and 15.0% respectively). 
Further, the median MNC has subsidiaries in 5 different countries (mean is 8.611). 54.8% of 
the domestic subsidiaries and 42.6% of the foreign subsidiaries operate in the same 2 digit 
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industry as their parent company. Approximately 83% of the subsidiaries are fully owned by 
the parent company. 
*** Table 3 about here *** 
Pearson correlation coefficients between subsidiary and subsidiary country 
characteristics are reported in Table 3. The correlations for distance, tax credit and subsidiary 
country characteristics are calculated for foreign subsidiaries only. The table illustrates that it 
is important to consider the availability of private credit in a country, which is strongly and 
positively related to rule of law, control of corruption and perception of corruption in the 
country. 
*** Table 4 about here *** 
4. Results 
4.1. MNC consolidated cash holdings 
Before considering subsidiary cash holdings, we first investigate the determinants of 
MNC consolidated cash holdings. This allows us to assess the extent to which the 
determinants of cash holdings of the MNCs in our sample are comparable to those found in 
other studies. We estimate OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered by MNCs.6 
The regression models include determinants found in prior research and we add measures of 
corporate governance and the availability of private credit in the MNC home country.7 Results 
are reported in Table 4. The home country corporate governance measures are not 
significantly related to MNC consolidated cash holdings, indicating that corporate governance 
in the home country does not matter much for the consolidated cash holdings of MNCs. A 
possible explanation for this result is that cash holdings of the foreign subsidiaries are affected 
                                                 
6
 Since the regressions include time-invariant variables we cannot include firm-fixed effects. 
7
 Capital expenditures are not included in the MNC-regressions because there are too many outliers for this 
variable in the MNC-sample. 
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by corporate governance in the different subsidiary countries, rather than corporate 
governance in the MNC home country. Home country private credit on the other hand is 
significantly and negatively related to consolidated cash holdings, which indicates that the 
availability of external financing in the home country reduces the overall need for MNCs to 
hold cash. External financing obtained in the home country may be redistributed among 
foreign subsidiaries via an internal capital market.8 
Ln(countries), which measures the complexity and the extent of internationalization of 
the MNC, is significantly and positively related to MNC consolidated cash holdings. This 
suggests that a higher degree of internationalization increases asymmetric information 
problems and creates transaction and tax costs of cross-border payments within the MNC. The 
results for the other variables are generally in line with previous findings in the literature: 
larger firms, firms with a higher leverage, a higher market-to-book ratio and more intangible 
assets hold significantly more cash. However, cash flow and net working capital are not 
significantly related to MNC consolidated cash holdings.  
*** Table 5 about here *** 
4.2. Subsidiary cash holdings 
Next, we investigate the relation between subsidiary cash holdings and headquarters-
subsidiary characteristics. The results are reported in Table 5. In all regressions for subsidiary 
cash holdings, standard errors are clustered by MNCs and subsidiaries.9 Regression model 4 
is estimated for the full sample, which includes both domestic and foreign subsidiaries. As 
expected, foreign subsidiaries hold more cash than domestic subsidiaries, and horizontal 
                                                 
8
 In unreported regressions (results available from the authors upon request) we find that better firm-level 
corporate governance also reduces cash holdings: MNCs with more institutional shareholders and analyst 
following hold significantly less cash.  
9We used the Stata-routine written by Mitchell Petersen to cluster standard errors by two dimensions: see 
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/petersen/htm/papers/se/se_programming.htm. Clustering standard 
errors by MNCs or subsidiaries alone does not alter any of the results reported in this paper (results available 
from the authors upon request). 
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subsidiaries hold more cash than other subsidiaries. The coefficients of domestic subsidiary 
and horizontal subsidiary are statistically significant at the 1% level. The effects of domestic 
versus foreign subsidiaries and horizontal versus vertical subsidiaries are also economically 
significant. Since the dependent variable is the log of cash holdings, the coefficient of -0.471 
for domestic subsidiary can be interpreted as an expected difference in cash holdings between 
domestic and foreign subsidiaries of 47.1%. Likewise, horizontal subsidiaries are expected to 
hold 30.7% more cash than vertical subsidiaries. The fully owned coefficient on the other 
hand has the predicted negative sign but it is not statistically significant. The hypothesis that 
subsidiary cash holdings are affected by the presence of minority shareholders is therefore not 
confirmed.   
As for the other variables included in the model, subsidiary cash holdings are strongly 
and positively related to MNC consolidated cash holdings. Subsidiaries hold more cash if the 
MNC overall holds more cash. In line with findings from prior research, subsidiaries hold 
more cash if they are smaller, have more intangible assets, generate higher cash flows, and 
invest less.10 One surprising finding is the significant positive relation between cash holdings 
and leverage. A possible explanation for this result could be that subsidiaries hold more cash 
after they received intragroup loans via the internal capital market of the MNC. 
In a next step, we estimate separate regressions for domestic subsidiaries and foreign 
subsidiaries. The results for domestic subsidiaries (model 5) confirm the results for the full 
sample. Horizontal subsidiaries hold more cash, while the presence of minority shareholders 
is not related to subsidiary cash holdings. We find the same result for foreign subsidiaries in 
model 6, which includes two additional variables: distance and tax credit. The distance 
coefficient is insignificant and even has a negative sign, which suggests that geographical 
                                                 
10
 Again, when interpreting the results for these variables it should be taken into account that the dependent 
variable is the log of cash holdings. For example, the cash flow coefficient of 2.147 implies that a one standard 
deviation increase in cash flow increases cash holdings by 30.3%.  
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distance does not affect subsidiary cash holdings.11 The tax credit coefficient on the other 
hand is positive and significant at the 1% level, confirming that subsidiaries for which a 
residence based tax credit system applies hold more cash than subsidiaries for which income 
paid to the parent is tax exempted. As for the other control variables, it is interesting to note 
that leverage is not significantly related to foreign subsidiary cash holdings, which suggests 
that the cash policy of foreign subsidiaries is independent of their debt policy. Our finding 
that cash holdings of foreign subsidiaries are not related to leverage, while cash holdings of 
domestic subsidiaries are positively related to leverage is consistent with the conjecture that 
foreign subsidiaries are less likely to receive cash via intragroup loans than domestic 
subsidiaries because foreign subsidiaries tend to operate more independently from 
headquarters.  
*** Table 6 about here *** 
Table 6 reports results on the impact of subsidiary country-level corporate governance 
on subsidiary cash holdings. All regression models include the same control variables as 
before, but for brevity we only report results for the main variables of interest. The results for 
the control variables (available from the authors upon request) are fully consistent with the 
results in Table 5. Regression models 7, 8 and 9 consider the effect of rule of law, control of 
corruption and corruption perception respectively. All three measures of country corporate 
governance are significantly and positively related to subsidiary cash holdings, confirming the 
hypothesis that better law enforcement and lower (perceived) corruption in the subsidiary 
country provide an environment in which managers can be trusted to hold cash. For example, 
the difference of approximately 1.5 between the 2004 rule of law score of the weakest country 
(Slovak Republic: 0.478) and the strongest country (Switzerland: 1.973) in our sample implies 
an expected difference in cash holdings between subsidiaries in both countries of 90.3%.  
                                                 
11
 The effect of distance remains insignificant if we consider the log of distance instead of distance. 
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Furthermore, the availability of private credit in the subsidiary country is significantly and 
negatively related to subsidiary cash holdings, which is consistent with the argument that the 
availability of credit in the subsidiary country reduces the need for subsidiaries to hold cash. 
The private credit coefficient of -0.005 implies an expected difference in cash holdings of 
approximately 63.5% between subsidiaries in the country with the lowest availability of 
private credit in 2004 (Slovak Republic) and subsidiaries in the country with the highest 
availability of private credit (Switzerland). The opposing effects of the country corporate 
governance variables and the availability of private credit on subsidiary cash holdings confirm 
our expectations. Nevertheless they are remarkable given that Table 3 revealed that these 
variables are (unsurprisingly) strongly positively correlated. 
*** Table 7 about here *** 
4.3. Robustness checks 
A majority of the MNC headquarters and the subsidiaries in our sample are located in 
France or the UK 12  This raises the concern that our results are driven by specific 
characteristics of MNCs and subsidiaries in these countries. To investigate this issue, we re-
estimated the regressions in Tables 5 and 6 for a restricted sample which excludes MNCs and 
subsidiaries located in France or the UK. This restriction reduces the sample to 2,182 
observations for domestic subsidiaries and 1,745 observations for foreign subsidiaries. The 
regression results, which are reported in Table 7, generally confirm those for the original 
sample. Domestic subsidiaries hold less cash than foreign subsidiaries; horizontal subsidiaries 
hold more cash than other subsidiaries; a better rule of law and lower corruption increase cash 
holdings, while a higher credit available in the subsidiary country reduces its cash holdings. 
Additionally, the fully owned dummy is now significantly positive at the 10% level for 
                                                 
12
 This is to some extent a consequence of differences in the available data for different countries in the Amadeus 
database we used. For example the coverage of Belgium, France,and the UK is much wider than the coverage of 
Germany or the Netherlands. 
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foreign subsidiaries, which is consistent with the hypothesis that the presence of minority 
shareholders makes it more difficult to tailor subsidiary activities to the needs of the MNC. 
Another potential problem may arise from including MNC consolidated cash holdings 
as a determinant of subsidiary cash holdings since the cash held by the subsidiary will be 
incorporated in the consolidated cash holdings. For subsidiaries which are relatively large to 
the MNC, the cash they hold could therefore significantly affect consolidated cash holdings. 
To investigate whether this affects our results, we subtracted subsidiary cash holdings from 
consolidated cash holdings before including the log of consolidated cash holdings in the 
models.13 The results (available upon request) are very similar to those reported in the paper. 
We also re-estimated all subsidiary level regression models without MNC consolidated cash 
holdings. Again, results (available upon request) are qualitatively the same as the ones 
reported in the paper. 
Additionally, we recoded the horizontal subsidiary dummy based on 4 digit NACE 
code instead of 2 digit NACE code. The results (available upon request) are again 
qualitatively the same as the ones reported in the tables. 
5. Conclusions 
This study provides evidence on the cash policies of multinational corporations. While 
there is an extensive literature on the determinants of cash holdings of firms, the role of cash 
in MNCs has so far been neglected. This is remarkable since MNCs play a crucial role in the 
global economy, and the agency-relationship between headquarters and subsidiaries in MNCs 
is fundamentally different from the shareholder-management relationship in most other firms. 
Furthermore, the fact that MNCs operate in foreign countries where corporate governance 
may be very different from the home country, raises the question how local corporate 
                                                 
13
 It should be noted that this approach in some cases leads to negative cash figures because the extent to which 
subsidiary cash holdings are incorporated in consolidated MNC cash holdings depends on consolidation rules, 
which we do not know. 
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governance regimes affect the cash policy of subsidiaries. Our results are generally consistent 
with the hypothesis that cash holdings by MNC subsidiaries reflect the subsidiary’s 
independence from headquarters. The independence of subsidiaries is determined by a trade-
off between the superior knowledge the subsidiary has over headquarters, and the agency 
costs of discretionary behavior by the subsidiary’s management.  
We find that foreign subsidiaries and horizontal subsidiaries, which typically have 
more specific knowledge over headquarters than domestic subsidiaries and vertical 
subsidiaries, hold more cash. We also find some evidence that subsidiaries with minority 
shareholders, which are less likely to participate in an internal capital market of the MNC also 
hold more cash. While geographical distance between the subsidiary and headquarters does 
not seem to matter, country-level corporate governance plays an important role. MNCs allow 
their foreign subsidiaries to hold more cash if there is a better law enforcement and lower 
corruption in the subsidiary country. Further, we find that subsidiaries hold less cash if there 
is more external financing available in the subsidiary country. The availability of external 
financing in the MNC home country reduces the overall cash holdings of the MNC. Finally, it 
is interesting to note that taxation also seems to have a significant effect on subsidiary cash 
holdings. Subsidiaries hold more cash if payouts to the MNC are likely to be taxed in the 
home country of the MNC.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
Country characteristics in 2004 
 Rule of 
law 
Control of 
corruption 
Corruption 
perception 
Private 
credit 
No. of 
MNC obs. 
No. of 
subsidiary obs. 
Austria 1.802 2.095 8.4 105 0 13 
Belgium 1.492 1.510 7.5 72 248 1,983 
Czech Republic 0.699 0.362 4.2 33 0 25 
Finland 1.897 2.456 9.7 68 375 953 
France 1.393 1.442 7.1 90 1,091 4,086 
Germany 1.708 1.911 8.2 112 604 174 
Greece 0.822 0.570 4.3 70 0 227 
Hungary 0.821 0.678 4.8 46 0 23 
Ireland 1.569 1.511 7.5 135 6 15 
Italy 0.666 0.608 4.8 85 248 781 
Netherlands 1.751 2.021 8.7 158 395 220 
Slovak Republic 0.478 0.996 4.0 30 0 24 
Spain 1.202 1.414 7.1 125 106 171 
Sweden 1.863 2.166 9.2 103 291 500 
Switzerland 1.973 2.101 9.1 157 82 48 
United Kingdom 1.713 1.989 8.6 153 3,099 4,078 
Total:     6,545 13,321 
Rule of law measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence (source: Kaufman, 2007); Control of corruption measures the exercise of public power for 
private gain, including both petty and grand corruption and state capture (source: Kaufman, 2007); 
Corruption perception measures the perceived public sector corruption (source: Transparency 
International); Private credit  is domestic credit to private sector as a % of GDP (source: World Bank). 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
                     MNCs                                             
(6,545 MNC-year observations) 
Domestic subsidiaries                    
(8,321 subsidiary-year observations) 
Foreign subsidiaries                       
(5,000 subsidiary-year observations) 
 Me an Median St. dev. Mean Median St. dev. Mean Median St. dev. 
Cash holdings 0.140 0.067 0.218 0.171 0.034 0.457 0.150 0.042 0.380 
Net assets 4.43 bio € 121 bio € 22.6 bio € 199 mio € 17 mio € 783 mio € 234 mio € 24 mio € 804 mio € 
Cash flow 0.125 0.128 0.141 0.138 0.124 0.211 0.119 0.101 0.201 
Leverage 0.234 0.212 0.178 0.286 0.144 0.387 0.165 0.031 0.294 
Net working capital 0.246 0.234 0.191 0.206 0.167 0.266 0.281 0.271 0.273 
Intangibility 0.294 0.189 0.294 0.116 0.002 0.237 0.127 0.011 0.226 
Market-to-book 1.540 1.207 1.164       
Countries 8.611 5 12.105       
Capital expenditures    0.065 0.034 0.137 0.053 0.029 0.136 
Financial subsidiary     0.4%   1.1%   
Horizontal subsidiary    54.8%   42.6%   
Fully owned    82.5%   83.7%   
Distance  (1,000 km)       0.763 0.652 0.519 
Tax credit       38.4%   
Cash holdings is cash and cash equivalents over net assets; Net assets is total assets minus cash and cash equivalents; Cash flow is EBITDA over net assets; 
Leverage is short-term and long-term debt over net assets; Net working capital is (inventories plus receivables minus payables) over net assets; Intangibility 
is intangible fixed assets over total fixed assets; Market-to-book is the market value over the book value of assets; Countries is the number of countries 
(worldwide) in which the MNC has subsidiaries; Capital expenditures is the change in fixed assets over the year plus depreciation over net assets; Financial 
subsidiary is a dummy variable equal to one if the subsidiary is in NACE industries 65 or 67; Horizontal subsidiary is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
subsidiary is in the same 2 digit NACE industry as its parent; Fully owned is a dummy variable equal to one if the subsidiary is fully owned by its parent; 
Domestic subsidiary is a dummy variable equal to one if the subsidiary is located in the same country as its parent; Distance is the km distance between the 
capital cities of the home country and the subsidiary country; Tax credit is a dummy equal to one if the home country grants credits for taxes paid in the 
subsidiary country.  
 
 
 28
Table 3 
Pearson correlation coefficients 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
All subsidiaries (13,321 subsidiary-year observations) 
(1) Ln(cash holdings) 1.000                
(2) Ln(MNC cash holdings) 0.251 1.000               
(3) Ln(net assets) -0.277 -0.170 1.000              
(4) Net working capital 0.022 0.050 -0.113 1.000             
(5) Cash flow 0.176 0.035 -0.071 0.095 1.000            
(6) Leverage  -0.002 -0.091 0.035 -0.105 -0.147 1.000           
(7) Capital expenditures -0.049 -0.024 0.042 -0.123 0.105 0.025 1.000          
(8) Intangibility  0.047 0.050 -0.032 -0.028 -0.041 -0.031 0.046 1.000         
(9) Financial subsidiary -0.027 -0.018 0.030 -0.024 0.004 0.010 0.036 -0.024 1.000        
(10) Horizontal subsidiary 0.051 0.035 0.104 -0.079 0.067 0.024 0.046 -0.002 -0.082 1.000       
(11) Fully owned -0.049 -0.109 0.075 0.028 0.011 0.129 -0.011 -0.053 0.032 0.021 1.000      
(12) Domestic subsidiary -0.032 -0.042 -0.073 -0.135 0.044 0.166 0.043 -0.022 -0.037 0.119 -0.015      
Foreign subsidiaries (5,000 subsidiary-year observations) 
(13) Distance -0.070 -0.040 0.190 0.057 0.030 -0.040 0.011 0.024 -0.017 0.032 0.007 1.000     
(14) Tax credit 0.078 -0.043 0.023 -0.077 -0.045 -0.013 0.000 0.030 -0.038 0.054 0.030 0.140 1.000    
(15) Rule of law 0.056 -0.036 -0.055 -0.010 -0.058 0.139 -0.039 -0.118 0.049 -0.045 0.066 -0.337 0.068 1.000   
(16) Control of corruption 0.042 -0.047 -0.021 0.003 -0.053 0.138 -0.021 -0.108 0.051 -0.037 0.080 -0.277 0.075 0.973 1.000  
(17) Corruption perception 0.025 -0.022 0.018 0.028 -0.053 0.113 -0.045 -0.080 0.044 -0.031 0.073 -0.196 0.103 0.938 0.943 1.000 
(18) Private credit -0.055 -0.009 0.054 0.057 -0.072 0.132 -0.036 -0.049 0.007 -0.057 0.032 -0.096 -0.009 0.476 0.503 0.487 
Bold indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Cash holdings is cash and cash equivalents over net assets; MNC cash holdings is MNC cash and cash equivalents over MNC net assets; Net assets is total assets minus cash and 
cash equivalents; Net working capital is (inventories plus receivables minus payables) over net assets; Cash flow is EBITDA over net assets; Leverage is short-term and long-term 
debt over net assets; Capital expenditures is the change in book value of fixed assets plus depreciation over net assets; Intangibility is intangible fixed assets over total fixed assets; 
Financial subsidiary is a dummy equal to one if the subsidiary activity is financial intermediation (NACE codes 65 and 67); Horizontal subsidiary is a dummy equal to one if the 
subsidiary has the same two digit NACE classification as the parent; Fully owned is a dummy equal to one if the subsidiary is fully owned by its parent; Domestic subsidiary is a 
dummy equal to one if the subsidiary is located in the same country as its parent; Distance is distance between the capital cities of the home country and the subsidiary country ; Tax 
credit is a dummy equal to one if the home country grants credits for taxes paid in the subsidiary country; Rule of law measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society; Control of corruption measures the exercise of public power for private gain, including both petty and grand corruption and state capture; Corruption 
perception measures the perceived public sector corruption; Private credit is domestic credit to private sector as a % of GDP. 
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Table 4 
MNC consolidated cash holdings 
Dependent variable: Ln(Cash holdings) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Home country CG measure: Rule of law Control of 
corruption 
Corruption 
perception 
Home country CG 0.143 0.016 -0.006 
 (0.289) (0.862) (0.826) 
Home country private credit -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln(Countries) 0.157*** 0.158*** 0.158*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln(Net assets) -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Cash flow 0.405 0.406 0.406 
 (0.119) (0.120) (0.120) 
Leverage -1.758*** -1.753*** -1.752*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Net working capital 0.029 0.038 0.041 
 (0.875) (0.838) (0.825) 
Market-to-book 0.178*** 0.176*** 0.176*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intangibility 0.479*** 0.473*** 0.470*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry and year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of observations 6,545 6,545 6,545 
R-Squared 0.163 0.162 0.162 
Cash holdings is cash and cash equivalents over net assets; Rule of law measures the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society); Control of corruption measures the 
exercise of public power for private gain, including both petty and grand corruption and state capture; 
Corruption perception measures the perceived public sector corruption; Private credit is domestic 
credit to private sector as a % of GDP; Countries is the number of countries (worldwide) in which the 
MNC has subsidiaries; Net assets is total assets minus cash and cash equivalents; Cash flow is 
EBITDA over net assets; Leverage is short-term and long-term debt over net assets; Net working 
capital is (inventories plus receivables minus payables) over net assets; Market-to-book is the market 
value over the book value of assets; Intangibility is intangible fixed assets over total fixed assets. 
Robust P-values in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firms. ***: denotes 
significance at the 1% level; **: denotes significance at the 5% level; *: denotes significance at the 
10% level. 
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Table 5 
Subsidiary cash holdings and the headquarters-subsidiary relationship 
Dependent variable: Ln(Cash holdings) 
 (4) (5) (6) 
Subsidiaries: All Domestic Foreign 
Domestic subsidiary -0.471***   
 
(0.000) 
 
 
Fully owned -0.075 -0.070 -0.152 
 (0.435) (0.593) (0.264) 
Horizontal subsidiary 0.307*** 0.316*** 0.287** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.022) 
Distance   -0.069 
   (0.558) 
Tax credit   0.418*** 
   (0.001) 
Ln(MNC cash holdings) 0.416*** 0.478*** 0.294*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln(Net assets) -0.291*** -0.263*** -0.333*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash flow 2.147*** 2.206*** 2.069*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.487*** 0.662*** 0.017 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.913) 
Net working capital -0.235 -0.195 -0.199 
 (0.105) (0.359) (0.272) 
Capital expenditures -1.017*** -1.150*** -0.737*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) 
Intangibility 0.409*** 0.530*** 0.128 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.541) 
Financial subsidiary -0.834* 0.246 -1.604*** 
 (0.071) (0.670) (0.003) 
Industry and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 13,321 8,321 5,000 
R-Squared 0.180 0.187 0.191 
Cash holdings is cash and cash equivalents over net assets; Domestic subsidiary is a dummy equal to one 
if the subsidiary is located in the same country as its parent; Fully owned is a dummy equal to one if the 
subsidiary is fully owned by its parent; Horizontal subsidiary is a dummy equal to one if the subsidiary 
has the same two digit NACE classification as the parent; Distance is the distance between the capital 
cities of the home country and the subsidiary country; Tax credit is a dummy equal to one if the home 
country grants credits for taxes paid in the subsidiary country; MNC cash holdings is MNC cash and cash 
equivalents over MNC net assets; Net assets is total assets minus cash and cash equivalents; Cash flow is 
EBITDA over net assets; Leverage is short-term and long-term debt over net assets; net working capital 
is (inventories plus receivables minus payables) over net assets; Capital expenditures is the change in 
book value of fixed assets plus depreciation over net assets; Intangibility is intangible fixed assets over 
total fixed assets; Financial subsidiary is a dummy equal to one if the subsidiary activity is financial 
intermediation (NACE codes 65 and 67). P-values in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered 
by MNCs and subsidiaries. ***: denotes significance at the 1% level; **: denotes significance at the 5% 
level; *: denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 6 
Subsidiary cash holdings and country-level corporate governance 
Dependent variable: Ln(Cash holdings) 
 (7) (8) (9) 
Subsidiaries: Foreign Foreign Foreign 
Subsidiary country CG measure: Rule of law Control of 
corruption 
Corruption 
perception 
Subsidiary country CG 0.602*** 0.395*** 0.107** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.023) 
Subsidiary country private credit -0.005** -0.005** -0.005* 
 (0.042) (0.040) (0.074) 
Fully owned -0.167 -0.172 -0.166 
 (0.219) (0.206) (0.221) 
Horizontal subsidiary 0.285** 0.282** 0.284** 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) 
Distance 0.034 0.004 -0.029 
 (0.788) (0.975) (0.810) 
Control variables included Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 5,000 5,000 5,000 
R-Squared 0.196 0.195 0.194 
Cash holdings is cash and cash equivalents over net assets; Rule of law measures the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society; Control of corruption measures the 
exercise of public power for private gain, including both petty and grand corruption and state capture; 
Corruption perception measures the perceived public sector corruption; Private credit is domestic 
credit to private sector as a % of GDP; Fully owned is a dummy equal to one if the subsidiary is fully 
owned by its parent; Horizontal subsidiary is a dummy equal to one if the subsidiary has the same two 
digit NACE classification as the parent; Distance is the distance between the capital cities of the home 
country and the subsidiary country. Control variables are Tax credit, which is a dummy equal to one if 
the home country grants credits for taxes paid in the subsidiary country; MNC cash holdings, which is 
MNC cash and cash equivalents over MNC net assets; Net assets which is total assets minus cash and 
cash equivalents; Cash flow which is EBITDA over net assets; Leverage which is short-term and long-
term debt over net assets; Net working capital which is (inventories plus receivables minus payables) 
over net assets; Capital expenditures which is the change in book value of fixed assets plus 
depreciation over net assets; Intangibility which is intangible fixed assets over total fixed assets; 
Financial subsidiary which is a dummy equal to one if the subsidiary activity is financial 
intermediation (NACE codes 65 and 67); industry and year fixed effects. P-values in parentheses are 
based on standard errors clustered by MNCs and subsidiaries. ***: denotes significance at the 1% 
level; **: denotes significance at the 5% level; *: denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 7 
Subsidiary cash holdings - MNCs and subsidiaries outside the UK and France 
Dependent variable: Ln(Cash holdings) 
 (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Subsidiaries: All Domestic Foreign Foreign Foreign 
Subsidiary country CG measure:   Rule of law Control of 
corruption 
Corruption 
perception 
Domestic subsidiary -0.817***     
 (0.000)     
Subsidiary country CG   0.933*** 0.605** 0.161** 
 
  (0.004) (0.012) (0.023) 
Subsidiary country private credit   -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.008** 
   (0.003) (0.005) (0.015) 
Fully owned -0.222 -0.056 -0.512* -0.547* -0.533* 
 (0.256) (0.837) (0.070) (0.053) (0.052) 
Horizontal subsidiary 0.403*** 0.350* 0.486** 0.484** 0.484** 
 (0.006) (0.071) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) 
Distance   0.018 -0.025 -0.107 
   (0.936) (0.913) (0.632) 
Control variables included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 3,927 2,182 1,745 1,745 1,745 
R-Squared 0.175 0.180 0.207 0.204 0.202 
Cash holdings is cash and cash equivalents over net assets; Rule of law measures the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society; Control of corruption measures the exercise of public power for 
private gain, including both petty and grand corruption and state capture; Corruption perception measures the 
perceived public sector corruption; private credit is domestic credit to private sector as a % of GDP; Domestic 
subsidiary is a dummy equal to one if the subsidiary is located in the same country as its parent; Fully owned is a 
dummy equal to one if the subsidiary is fully owned by its parent; Horizontal subsidiary is a dummy equal to one 
if the subsidiary has the same two digit NACE classification as the parent; Distance is the distance between the 
capital cities of the home country and the subsidiary country. Control variables are Tax credit, which is a dummy 
equal to one if the home country grants credits for taxes paid in the subsidiary country; MNC cash holdings, which 
is MNC cash and cash equivalents over MNC net assets; Net assets which is total assets minus cash and cash 
equivalents; Cash flow which is EBITDA over net assets; Leverage which is short-term and long-term debt over 
net assets; Net working capital which is (inventories plus receivables minus payables) over net assets; Capital 
expenditures which is the change in book value of fixed assets plus depreciation over net assets; Intangibility 
which is intangible fixed assets over total fixed assets; Financial subsidiary which is a dummy equal to one if the 
subsidiary activity is financial intermediation (NACE codes 65 and 67); industry and year fixed effects. P-values 
in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by MNCs and subsidiaries. ***: denotes significance at the 
1% level; **: denotes significance at the 5% level; *: denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
